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Bremer: Private Complements

Private Complements to Public Governance
Emily S. Bremer*

If Philip Hamburger’s arguments were to win the day, and the administrative state were abolished or significantly reduced in size and scope, what
would replace it?1 If it were abolished completely, perhaps the simplest answer could be given: only the classical institutions of government created by
the U.S. Constitution – the Legislature, Executive, and Judiciary – would
remain.2 In the more likely event that the administrative state were reduced
in size or scope, one or more alternative approaches might be needed to fill
the resulting regulatory gaps. Indeed, a principal justification for the administrative state is that the needs of modern regulation are beyond the capacity
of the classical institutions of government.3 If so, then without administrative
agencies, some other institution or approach would be needed to address
modern regulatory problems.
This Article suggests that private governance offers an attractive alternative or complement to the administrative state. It is commonly assumed that
without administrative agencies, there would be no regulation. As a foundational matter, this Article challenges the notion that there are only two, mutually exclusive options: governmental regulation or no regulation all. Although it is perfectly natural for public law scholars to focus primarily on regulation through government institutions and programs, much regulation is in
fact accomplished via mechanisms outside the administrative state.4 At least
in some circumstances, it is not only possible but may even be preferable to
use such private governance – alone or in conjunction with public regulation
– to achieve public goals.

*

Assistant Professor of Law, University of Wyoming College of Law.
1. See PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? (2014). I
leave it to other contributors to this Symposium to directly address Philip Hamburger’s arguments against the administrative state. Leaving aside the first-order question
of whether those arguments are persuasive, I focus exclusively on the possibility of
workable alternatives to the modern administrative state.
2. See U.S. CONST. arts. I–III.
3. See Kent Barnett, Why Bias Challenges to Administrative Adjudication
Should Succeed, 81 MO. L. REV. 1023, 1038 (2016) (“[Under a full-throated nondelegation doctrine,] Congress would be required to legislate on technical subjects on a
magnitude too large for it to keep a modern economy and government functioning.”).
4. For example, social norms as a non-legal force regulating conduct have attracted significant scholarly attention. See generally ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND
SOCIAL NORMS (2002); ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW
NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991); cf. Richard H. McAdams, Signaling Discount
Rates: Law, Norms, and Economic Methodology, 110 YALE L.J. 625, 626 (2001)
(“The number of articles using a rational choice framework to discuss the interaction
of law and norms is now too large to list even in a law review footnote.”).
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Before this possibility can be assessed, “private governance” must be
defined. As the term itself suggests, private governance has two components
that are both self-evident and yet also warrant elaboration. First, private governance must be private, which most importantly means nongovernmental.5
It thus includes any action by people, entities, or institutions that exist outside
of government. Second, private governance must be governance, defined
broadly as actions in pursuit of traditionally governmental ends.6 These ends
may include the protection of public values, the provision of public goods,
and the regulation of social conduct in a manner that is beneficial for society
as a whole.
To make this abstract definition of “private governance” more concrete,
Part I of this Article begins by offering a number of examples of how private
governance presently complements the administrative state. Part II suggests
that the concept of comparative institutional advantage offers a touchstone for
identifying situations in which private governance may be an effective and
attractive alternative to governmental regulation. Recognizing that private
governance is not always the best option, however, Part II also suggests some
limitations on its use.

I. A SPECTRUM OF PRIVATE ACTION TOWARD PUBLIC ENDS
There are a variety of ways in which private governance can be used to
achieve public ends, and the options can best be understood by organizing
them along a spectrum. At one end of the spectrum are regimes that use or
leverage private governance mechanisms but are designed, created, driven,
and controlled by government. At the other end of the spectrum are regimes
that are designed to achieve traditionally governmental ends but are independently designed, created, driven, and controlled by private sector actors
and institutions. Frequently the focus of economic analysis, scholars describe
these latter regimes as “private ordering” or “private governance.”7 Between
the two extremes are regimes that mix elements of public and private governance, using each approach in some measure to achieve regulatory goals. Over
5. See Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Private Life of Public Law, 105 COLUM. L.
REV. 2029, 2031 (2005) [hereinafter Vandenbergh, Private Life].
6. Cf. Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, 99
CORNELL L. REV. 129, 146 (2013) [hereinafter Vandenbergh, Private Environmental
Governance] (defining “private environmental governance” as “actions taken by nongovernmental entities that are designed to achieve traditionally governmental ends”).
Some scholars have used the term “private regulation” to mean essentially the same
thing. See, e.g., Lesley K. McAllister, Harnessing Private Regulation, 3 MICH. J.
ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 291, 293 (2014) (using the term “private regulation” to refer to
situations in which “private actors engage in developing and implementing rules that
serve the traditional social goals of public regulation, particularly health, safety, and
environmental protection”).
7. See generally Avery Katz, Taking Private Ordering Seriously, 144 U. PA. L.
REV. 1745 (1996) (discussing the law and economics literature on private ordering).
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the last fifteen years, public law scholars have increasingly noted and examined these regimes, referring to them as “public-private hybrids.”8 Figure 1
offers a visual representation of the full spectrum.
Figure 1:
|----------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------|
Government

PublicPrivate Hybrids

Private
Governance

A. Government-Dominated Approaches
On the government side of the spectrum are programs through which
government institutions (e.g., Congress or an administrative agency) establish
substantive standards of conduct, leaving it to the private sector to implement
or enforce those standards.9 One way this may be accomplished is through
the creation of private rights of action to enforce federal statutes.10 For example, in the employment discrimination context, federal statutes create antidiscrimination rules, and these rules predominantly are enforced by private
litigants bringing lawsuits against offending employers in the federal courts.11
Government is paramount in this regime: Congress created the regime and the
8. Vandenbergh, Private Life, supra note 5, at 2032; see also, e.g., Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 546–49 (2000)
(describing “the reality of public/private interdependence” in regulatory decisionmaking). Public-private hybrids are sometimes also referred to as “governmentstakeholder network structures.” Vandenbergh, Private Life, supra note 5, at 2032.
9. This skips over purely governmental regulation because the subject of this
Article is how private governance either complements governmental regulation or
offers an alternative to it. Of course, even in “purely” government regulation, private
parties have some role. As Professor Vandenbergh explains, however, “[T]he story
about private actors has remained essentially static: Firms attempt to influence regulations, but once an agency promulgates a regulation, a private firm is assumed to either
comply or not comply.” Vandenbergh, Private Life, supra note 5, at 2031.
10. See generally J. Maria Glover, The Structural Role of Private Enforcement
Mechanisms in Public Law, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1137 (2012) (arguing that private regulation through litigation is an integral part of the modern administrative
state’s structure).
11. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 706(k), 78 Stat.
241, 261 (1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k)) (providing attorney’s fees to
prevailing private parties as an incentive to litigate employment discrimination
claims); George Rutherglen, Private Rights and Private Actions: The Legacy of Civil
Rights in the Enforcement of Title VII, 95 B.U. L. REV. 733, 734 (2015) (explaining
that “a crucial feature of Title VII as civil rights legislation” is that it “gives control
over enforcement of the statute to the individuals whose civil rights have been violated”); Glover, supra note 10, at 1148–1151 (offering labor and employment law as an
example of the history of the use of private litigation as a public law enforcement
mechanism).
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substantive standards that apply within it, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”) plays an important role within the regime, and the
federal courts control the incremental development of legal norms via individual decisions that have precedential effect. At the same time, individual
private citizens must bring the lawsuits in order to animate the regime and
make it effective.12

B. Public-Private Hybrids
Moving toward the private ordering end of the spectrum, there are public-private hybrids that involve a greater degree of independent private participation in the achievement of public ends.13 A key example is the privatization of traditionally public functions, which is often accomplished through
government contracting.14 In these arrangements, public funds are used to
pay a private entity to perform a public function that the government has historically performed, such as providing health and welfare services, public
education, or prisons.15 The government is a driving force in these relationships, defining and paying for the work that is performed and retaining significant contractual control over both the public-private relationship and the
contractors’ conduct.16
In some cases, public-private hybrids may also participate in the development of substantive regulatory standards and in the implementation and
enforcement of those standards. In these cases, there may be some contractual relationship between an administrative agency and one or more private
actors.17 But rather than providing public services to citizens, the resulting
public-private hybrid engages in one or more of three tasks that are traditionally the province of administrative agencies: “the setting, implementation,
and enforcement (including monitoring) of standards.”18 This occurs through
12. There are many other examples of the integral role of private lawsuits in the
U.S. regulatory system. See Anna Chu, The Need to Protect Private Enforcement
Mechanisms, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Nov. 7, 2014, 9:50 AM),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/regulation/news/
2014/11/07/100757/the-need-to-protect-private-enforcement-mechanisms/.
13. See generally Symposium, Thirty-Third Annual Administrative Law Issue:
Agencies, Economic Justice, and Private Initiatives, 53 DUKE L.J. 291 (2003); Symposium, New Forms of Governance: Ceding Power to Private Actors, 49 UCLA L.
REV. 1687 (2002).
14. See Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV.
1367, 1369 (2003); Michele E. Gilman, Legal Accountability in an Era of Privatized
Welfare, 89 CAL. L. REV. 569, 571 (2001).
15. See Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the
New Religion, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1229, 1237–42 (2003).
16. See Sidney A. Shapiro, Outsourcing Government Regulation, 53 DUKE L.J.
389 (2003).
17. See Vandenbergh, Private Life, supra note 5, at 2037.
18. Id. at 2038.
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a variety of methods, including negotiated rulemaking,19 the incorporation by
reference of privately developed standards into regulations,20 and the use of
audited self-regulation or third-party conformity assessment to support governmental regulatory regimes.21 Another example is second-order regulatory
agreements, which are “agreements entered into between regulated firms and
other private actors in the shadow of public regulations.”22 Private parties
undertake these agreements independently and without governmental involvement or direction. But they typically do so in response to the presence
or absence of regulation.23
Although public-private hybrids involve more independent action by
private entities to achieve public ends, the government retains primacy in the
relationship.24 For example, Jody Freeman, a scholar who has worked extensively in this area, has suggested “the possibility of harnessing private capacity to serve public goals.”25 Indeed, public law scholars often consider publicprivate hybrids attractive because of their potential to improve government
performance or solve perceived problems in public regulatory programs.26
19. See Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-648, 104 Stat.
4969 (1990) (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 561–570).
20. See National Technology Transfer & Advancement Act of 1995, Pub. L. No.
104-113, § 12(d), 110 Stat. 775 (1996) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3710a–3710d); Office of Management & Budget, Revision of OMB Circular No. A-119, “Federal Participation in the Development and Use of Voluntary Consensus Standards and in
Conformity Assessment Activities,” 81 Fed. Reg. 4673 (Jan. 27, 2016); Emily S.
Bremer, Incorporation by Reference in an Open-Government Age, 36 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 131, 139–41 (2013) [hereinafter Bremer, Incorporation by Reference].
The private standardization system is discussed further below. See infra Part I.C.
21. See, e.g., Lesley K. McAllister, Regulation by Third-Party Verification, 53
B.C. L. REV. 1 (2012) (discussing the use of third-party verification in regulation);
Douglas C. Michael, Federal Agency Use of Audited Self-Regulation as a Regulatory
Technique, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 171, 218–22 (1995) (discussing the use of private
auditing in hospitals).
22. Vandenbergh, Private Life, supra note 5, at 2030.
23. See generally Vandenbergh, Private Life, supra note 5 (discussing the role of
second-order agreements in regulation). When these agreements are entered into in
order to ensure compliance with existing regulations, they appear to be more like
public-private hybrids. When they are entered into to fill gaps where no public regulations yet exist, they may fall further along the spectrum toward private ordering.
See infra Part I.C.
24. See Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, supra note 6, at 146.
25. See Freeman, supra note 8, at 549; see also Nina A. Mendelson, Private
Control over Access to Public Law: The Perplexing Federal Regulatory Use of Private Standards, 112 MICH. L. REV. 737, 747 (2014) (defining “collaborative governance” as “the public enlisting of private institutions and resources in the process of
governance”); McAllister, supra note 6, at 295 (examining “whether and how private
regulation can be leveraged – or harnessed – by public regulators to achieve the objectives of public law” and address deficiencies of governmental regulation).
26. See Vandenbergh, Private Life, supra note 5, at 2039; Freeman, supra note 8,
at 548–49.
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Government ordinarily is the driving force in these arrangements, the focus of
which is the implementation of regulatory standards or objectives established
by government institutions.

C. Private Ordering
Moving still further in the direction of private ordering are alternatives
in which the primary public connection is to the ends or goals of a regime that
is predominantly controlled and driven by private institutions or actors. A
good recent example is found in Michael Vandenbergh’s work on private
environmental governance.27 Private environmental governance includes
actions voluntarily and independently undertaken by private sector actors to
achieve traditionally public ends in spaces where no governmental regulation
presently exists. These activities include collective environmental standard
setting, as well as purely private contracts that facilitate bilateral environmental standard setting, monitoring, and enforcement.28 One example is found in
the 465 ecolabelling programs that now exist around the world.29 In these
programs, nongovernmental organizations establish environmental standards
and award the privilege of using a particular label on products or services that
are certified compliant. Generally, no public law or governmental regulator
requires compliance with the standards, participation in the certification process, or display of the label. Private certification systems operate much the
same and serve similar functions.30 Another example is the Leadership in
Energy and Environmental Design (“LEED”) standards, which are established by the U.S. Green Building Council.31 These “standards allow builders
to certify compliance with efficiency and environmental requirements at several levels of stringency (Platinum, Gold, Silver, and Bronze).”32
Moving beyond the environmental context, the U.S. technical standardization system is a vast, predominately private, independent governance structure that has both a long history and a significant role in the achievement of
traditionally public goals.33 Technical standards are essential for technological innovation and interoperability, trade, the economy, and public health and
27. See generally Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, supra note

6.
28. See id.
29. See, e.g., ECOLABEL INDEX, www.ecolabelindex.com (last visited Oct. 25,

2016) (tracking 465 ecolabels in 199 countries and twenty-five industry sectors).
30. See Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, supra note 6, at 149–
151 (discussing certification systems for forestry sustainability, fishery sustainability,
and aquaculture).
31. See LEED, U.S. GREEN BUILDING COUNCIL, http://www.usgbc.org/leed (last
visited Oct. 25, 2016).
32. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, supra note 6, at 153.
33. See generally Emily S. Bremer, On the Cost of Private Standards in Public
Law, 63 KAN. L. REV. 279, 299–306 (2015) [hereinafter Bremer, On the Cost] (explaining the history and operation of the U.S. standards system).
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safety. Although these standards are a ubiquitous part of life, they are largely
invisible to the average consumer. The system through which these standards
are created emerged in the late 1800s and early 1900s, when a number of
private organizations emerged to fulfill the enormous standardization needs
of, first, the industrial revolution and, second, the World Wars.34 Today, this
system remains predominately private. But it has grown in size, importance,
and sophistication, with a large number of organizations using voluntary consensus procedures to create the standards and then maintain them as technology and other circumstances rapidly change and evolve.35
The U.S. standards system has largely escaped the notice of public law
scholars – perhaps because it is predominantly private – but its sheer size and
central importance to significant, traditionally public ends make it well worth
study.36 It is estimated that there are over 100,000 private technical standards
in use throughout the country, created by more than 600 active standards development organizations. To give a rough comparison with public regulation,
there are over 100 agencies in the federal government, and not all of these
exercise regulatory power. Although federal agencies commonly incorporate
private standards into federal regulations, it is estimated that only 2 to 4 percent of all private standards are ever so incorporated.37 As these numbers
suggest, the U.S. standards system is an enormous private governance regime
that has relatively minimal interface with governmental regulatory programs.
And yet it has for a long period succeeded in efficiently and effectively accomplishing a wide range of public goals.38
One way in which these various private governance regimes differ from
public-private hybrids is that they generally arise in the absence of govern-

34. Id. at 301, 305, 310.
35. See generally ANSI Essential Requirements: Due Process Requirements for

American National Standards, AM. NAT’L STANDARDS INST. (Jan. 2016),
https://share.ansi.org/shared%20documents/Standards%20Activities/American%20Na
tional%20Standards/Procedures,%20Guides,%20and%20Forms/2016_ANSI_Essential_R
equirements.pdf.
36. There has been a recent burst of scholarly interest in the incorporation by
reference of private technical standards because the copyrights that standards development organizations ordinarily assert in the standards they produce have emerged as
a barrier to making incorporated standards as freely available to the public as regulations and other agency documents have become in the Internet age. See Bremer, On
the Cost, supra note 33; Mendelson, supra note 25; Peter L. Strauss, Private Standards Organizations and Public Law, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 497 (2013);
Bremer, Incorporation by Reference, supra note 20; see also Administrative Conference of the United States, Recommendation 2011-5, Incorporation by Reference, 77
Fed. Reg. 2257, 2257 (Jan. 17, 2012) (recommending a collaborative, non-legislative
solution to the problem of public access to materials incorporated by reference in
federal regulation).
37. See Bremer, On the Cost, supra note 33, at 306–07
38. See Bremer, Incorporation by Reference, supra note 20, at 139–41.
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mental direction or regulation.39 In some cases, private governance fills a gap
in governmental regulation.40 For example, as Professor Vandenbergh notes,
Congress has failed to enact any major environmental legislation since the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, and so private actors have worked to fill
the gap by addressing new environmental problems and generating needed
environmental norms.41 The private standards system similarly emerged because of the failure of states and the federal government to meet widespread
standardization needs.42 In other cases, private actors may regulate themselves in an effort to forestall or preempt governmental regulation.43
The absence of public regulation distinguishes private governance from
public-private hybrids in another important respect: it provides greater latitude for independent private action with little or no governmental involvement. Private control in these areas is more comprehensive, beginning with
the development of substantive norms and continuing through the implementation and enforcement of those norms. The resulting regulatory system, although private, may be large, complex, sophisticated, and highly effective. In
some instances, so much so that public regulatory authorities may discover
that it is necessary to integrate existing private governance regimes into public regulation in order to best protect public values, promote health and safety, or fulfill other statutory mandates.44 In short, the primacy of government,
which is observable at previous points along the spectrum, is generally absent
in those areas in which private governance has emerged fully.

II. CHOOSING PRIVATE GOVERNANCE
If private governance can be considered as an alternative or complement
to the administrative state, what metric should be used to identify areas in
which the goals of existing public regulation might be addressed effectively
through private governance? Perhaps an appropriate metric is that of comparative institutional advantage, a concept often invoked in the separation of
powers context.45 Private actors or institutions may have characteristics that
39. See McAllister, supra note 6, at 293.
40. See, e.g., Larry Cata Backer, Private Actors and Public Governance Beyond

the State: The Multinational Corporation, the Financial Stability Board, and the
Global Governance Order, 18 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 751 (2011) (discussing
the role of private actors in transnational governance); John McMillan & Christopher
Woodruff, Private Order Under Dysfunctional Public Order, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2421
(2000) (describing how private ordering of commercial transactions arises in developing economies that are believed to have unreliable formal legal systems).
41. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, supra note 6, at 131–133.
42. See Bremer, On the Cost, supra note 33, at 303–04.
43. See McAllister, supra note 6, at 294.
44. See Bremer, On the Cost, supra note 33, at 308–09.
45. See, e.g., William H. Clune, Courts and Legislatures as Arbitrators of Social
Change,
93
YALE
L.J.
763,
763
(1984)
(“The
theory
of comparative institutional advantage allocates substantive decisionmaking between
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enable them to address certain kinds of regulatory problems more efficiently
or effectively than administrative agencies.46 In such instances, those private
actors or institutions may be said to have some comparative institutional advantage over public institutions such as federal regulatory agencies.
Private institutions may have several advantages over government agencies. First, in some cases, addressing a regulatory problem may require specialized experience or knowledge that exists outside of government. For example, developing technical standards ordinarily requires cutting-edge engineering or technological knowledge and experience.47 It is not primarily a
matter of making policy choices or creating rules to manage human conduct
or relations. Reflecting this reality, the people who volunteer their time to
participate in technical standards development are typically engineers or other
technical experts who work in the industry that will use and be affected by
the standards.48 Second, private institutions may be able to respond more
nimbly, efficiently, and cost-effectively than administrative agencies to
changes in technology, industry practice, or other circumstances.49 This is
partially because public law requirements, such as the procedural requirements for notice-and-comment rulemaking, do not constrain private institutions as they do administrative agencies.50 Private governance is often voluntary, accomplished by agreement and in accord with self-interest. Under
these conditions, it may be easier to take action. And that action may be accorded greater respect and adherence over time.
Just as private governance may have advantages, it may also have limitations. As noted, private governance is often effective and efficient precisely
because it is voluntary. But this suggests the possibility that private governance is unlikely to work well to address matters that are highly controversial
or significantly contested. If affected parties have strongly divergent inter-

courts and legislatures according to their relative ability to make truly representative
decisions.”).
46. See, e.g., Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, supra note 6, at
139 (“[G]overnment may not always be the best actor, and public regulation may not
always be the best type of intervention. The optimal response may be private governance or a mix of public and private governance.”).
47. See generally ROSS E. CHEIT, SETTING SAFETY STANDARDS: REGULATION IN
THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS (1990) (examining pairs of public and private
standards to evaluate the comparative institutional advantages of private standards
development organizations and federal regulatory agencies); cf. Timothy D. Lytton,
Competitive Third-Party Regulation: How Private Certification Can Overcome Constraints That Frustrate Government Regulation, 15 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 539,
539 (2014) (identifying “key features of reliable private certification and analyz[ing]
its comparative institutional advantages over government regulation”).
48. See Bremer, On the Cost, supra note 33, at 308.
49. See Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, supra note 6, at 138.
50. See generally 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012).
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ests, they may not be able to come to an agreement.51 In such circumstances,
the coercive authority of the state may be needed both to decide upon a
course of action and to implement or enforce the chosen solution.52 It may be
more appropriate in these situations for public institutions to govern.
In addition to such practical considerations, private governance may
raise normative and procedural concerns.53 When a regime is intended to
achieve public ends or protect public values, it may also be important for that
regime to adhere to rules and norms that reflect public values.54 For example,
a private governance system should be transparent, so that both its participants and products are knowable to a public that may be affected by that system. Rules to ensure openness and participation by a balanced range of affected interests may similarly be necessary to preserve legitimacy and protect
the substantive validity of a private governance regime.55 Experience shows
that government can influence private entities, both directly through regulation and indirectly through relationships and networks, to adopt these and
other socially beneficial rules and policies.56

III. CONCLUSION
This Article has suggested that the possibilities for private governance
are as numerous and diverse as are the challenges the modern administrative
state is designed to address. These possibilities could prove useful in the
event that, as Philip Hamburger has urged, the administrative state were to be
abolished or significantly reduced in scope. But private governance is also
worth considering – either alone or in conjunction with public regulation – in
the absence of such extraordinary circumstances. By considering the comparative institutional advantages of public and private actors and carefully
evaluating the public norms that may be at stake in a particular regulatory
51. See CHEIT, supra note 47, at 39–64 (discussing the private sector’s inability
to develop an effective standard to prevent the risks of combustible dust due to deep
disagreement over fundamentally non-technical issues).
52. See Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, supra note 6, at 143.
53. See, e.g., Ellen D. Katz, Private Order and Public Institutions, Comments on
McMillan and Woodruff’s ‘Private Order Under Dysfunctional Public Order’, 98
MICH. L. REV. 2481, 2481–82 (2000) (arguing that private ordering must be accompanied by public order in order to achieve “greater legitimacy and fairness”).
54. The application of public norms to private actors is referred to as “publicization.” See Avishai Benish & Asa Maron, Infusing Public Law into Privatized Welfare: Lawyers, Economists and the Competing Logics of Administrative Reform, 50 L.
& SOC’Y REV. 953, 956 (2016).
55. See, e.g., Office of Management & Budget, Revision of OMB Circular No.
A-119, “Federal Participation in the Development and Use of Voluntary Consensus
Standards and in Conformity Assessment Activities,” 81 Fed. Reg. 4673 (Jan. 27,
2016) (identifying basic procedural expectations for the development of voluntary
consensus technical standards).
56. See Freeman, supra note 8, at 671–73.
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context, the most effective mixture of public and private governance can be
selected. Public law scholars have recognized the potential, and there is significant opportunity to continue and expand upon that work.
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